The oil cycle, the Federal Reserve, and the monetary and exchange rate policies of Qatar by Khalid Rashid, Alkhater & Syed Abul, Basher
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The oil cycle, the Federal Reserve, and
the monetary and exchange rate policies
of Qatar
Alkhater Khalid Rashid and Basher Syed Abul
3. June 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65900/
MPRA Paper No. 65900, posted 3. August 2015 14:52 UTC
The Oil Cycle, the Federal Reserve, and the
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies of Qatar
Khalid Rashid Alkhatery Syed Abul Basherz;x
June 3, 2015
Abstract
Supporters of the Arab oil-exporting countries' decades-long xed exchange rate regime ar-
gue that since, oil is traded in United States (US) dollars, pegging to the dollar is optimal.
However, the weakening relationship between oil prices and the US economy in terms of
the Federal Reserve's expansionary monetary stance amid soaring oil prices for much of
the previous decade has raised questions about the viability of the peg. Using Qatar as a
case study, this paper empirically analyzes whether the synchronization pattern of business
cycles has recently changed between Qatar and the US. The results of the analysis show a
pronounced desynchronization or decoupling of business cycles between Qatar and the US
during 2001{2010. Moreover, the dissimilarly of demand shocks between the two countries
suggests that the imported monetary policy stance of the Federal Reserve has not been
viable for Qatar in recent years. A natural implication of our ndings is the need for a truly
independent monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals.
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1 Introduction
A large body of research has considered business cycle synchronization and/or shocks asym-
metry to study the feasibility of monetary union between countries. The basic idea is that if
business cycles between two countries were synchronized or if two countries experienced the
same disturbances, \abandoning policy autonomy for monetary unication will then entail rel-
atively little cost" (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, p. 4, 1994). In addition to the similarity of
the shocks and cycles, the literature of optimum currency areas (OCA) that started with the
seminal contribution by Mundell (1961) has focused on other inter-relationships such as the
extent of trade and the degree of labor mobility, as well as Kenen's (1969) criterion of scal
risk-sharing among the members of a potential OCA.
However, without denying the importance of these criteria,1 this paper focuses on the simi-
larity of the shocks and cycles to evaluate the monetary union between Qatar and the United
States (US) which has been in place over the past three decades. In particular, Qatar has main-
tained a de facto xed peg to the US dollar since 1980 and a de jure peg since 2001.2 Joining
a currency union is costly, as it would seriously constrain a country from using an independent
counter-cyclical monetary policy to dampen country-specic shocks (Frankel and Rose, 1998).
As the international transmission of real and monetary shocks depends on a country's choice
of exchange rate regime, on the basis of empirical evidence it will be argued why the existing
xed peg is no longer in Qatar's best interest for dealing with economic shocks that buet the
economy.
Like Qatar, some of its Gulf neighbors have also pegged their national currencies to the US
dollar. These include Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Although
Kuwait's currency is tied to a currency basket, it is widely believed that the US dollar has a
high weight in Kuwait's currency basket (Setser, 2007). Therefore, the entire Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) region, which consists of the six Gulf Arab countries, are in a currency union with
the US. Meanwhile, for several years, the GCC countries have been contemplating the creation
of a new monetary union (i.e., the Gulf Monetary Union) as a means to intensify regional
cooperation on political, economic and security, among other cooperations. The Arab oil-
exporting countries' decision to maintain the long-standing de facto dollar peg and the prospect
1As discussed in Appendix A, in the present context, the importance of the trade, labor and risk-sharing
criteria are somewhat weaker than the implications of dissimilar shocks or cycles.
2See Appendix B for a brief history of the exchange rate system in Qatar.
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of a Gulf monetary union have prompted a large number of studies analyzing a multitude of
economic issues. This is not the occasion to review these contributions; interested readers are
referred to available surveys by, among others, Buiter (2007), Alkholifey and Alreshan (2010),
and Alkhater (2012). It must be stressed here that this paper is not about the feasibility of the
Gulf monetary union; rather, it is related to the strand of the literature that assesses Qatar's
(and thereby the GCC's) currency peg to the US dollar. A brief overview of the ndings of
selected studies that are relevant to the present analysis is provided below.
Coury and Dave (2008) reported that over the period of 1980{2006, both the contempora-
neous and lagged business cycle components of Qatar were positively correlated with those of
the US (0.57 versus 0.32), though the lagged component was not statistically signicant. Fur-
thermore, contemporaneous price levels and ination rates between Qatar and the US were also
positively correlated (0.37 versus 0.25), but they were not statistically signicant. Cevik (2011)
found that the contemporaneous correlation between Qatar's real non-oil gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) cycle and the US's real GDP cycle over the period 1990{2010 was 0.31, declining to
0.23 during 2000{2010. In addition, the business cycle correlation coecients of Qatar vis-a-vis
Asia and the Eurozone evolved, respectively, from {0.19 and {0.37 in 1990{1999 to 0.34 and
0.35 during 2000{2010. The higher synchronization of Qatar's non-oil business cycle with Asia
and the Eurozone over the past decade compared with the 1990s alongside a less synchronized
cycle with the US reects the changing nature and composition of the Qatari economy.3
Raq (2011) demonstrated that the importance of common factor shocks|reecting the
US monetary policy and US demand shocks as well as changes in crude oil prices|have fallen
for Qatar over the period 1993{2005. Although his results also show that country-specic
shocks play a more important role in driving output uctuations at very short-term frequencies,
common factor innovations still matter at medium-term frequencies. On the basis of symmetric
aggregate demand shocks between the GCC and the US, Jean Louis et al. (2012) concluded
that the US dollar|rather than the Euro|remains the appropriate currency for pegging for
individual countries and the planned monetary union among GCC countries. Kim et al. (2012)
reported that US output shocks have a positive and material impact on the aggregate exports
3Although hydrocarbons still account for a sizable portion of GDP in Qatar, the share of non-hydrocarbon
sector increased from about 45% in 1980 to around 60% by end-2013. Interestingly, by developing large production
capacities of natural gas, Qatar has recently reduced its dependence on oil in favor of natural gas (Basher, 2010).
Furthermore, although trade with the US has remained relatively stable over the past three decades, Qatar's trade
with emerging Asian countries has increased impressively (see Appendix A for further details). There is more
to Qatar's resilient economy. In the midst of the recent global nancial crisis, Qatar's economy was relatively
unaected through trade and nancial channels (IMF, 2013).
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and output of the GCC region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main motivation of
the paper. It explains the evolution of the relationship between crude oil prices and the Federal
Reserve's monetary stance, and the resulting implications for the Qatari economy. Section 3
outlines the econometric methodologies used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the
ndings. Section 5 discusses the policy implications of the results of the analysis. Section 6
concludes the paper. All supporting materials are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Oil{US{Qatar Nexus
The purpose of this section is to shed light on the evolving relationship between the US and the
Qatari economy in relation to their dependence on oil. As Qatar (like its other GCC neighbors)
is in a monetary union with the US, it is useful to relate the federal funds rate (FFR)4 to that
of oil. The historical relationship between the US economy and oil prices can be analyzed from
both demand and supply side perspectives. From the demand side perspective, positive and
sustaining economic growth in the US would increase the world's demand for oil and therefore
international oil prices. Given the prospect that higher oil prices spill over into domestic prices
(through import prices), the Federal Reserve would intervene and raise the target for its FFR.
From the supply side perspective, a persistent rise in international oil prices (due to reasons
beyond the US's economy, such as war) prompt the Federal Reserve to increase the target for
the FFR, thereby slowing the growth of the US economy. This causal chain of actions becomes
easy to understand in a ow diagram:
Table 1: The Oil{US Economy Nexus
Demand side: " US economic growth ) " oil prices ) " federal funds rate
Supply side: " oil prices ) " federal funds rate ) # US economic growth
There is a plethora of empirical research supporting this causal linkage, albeit with mixed
evidence. For empirical work related to the demand side analysis, see Gately (1992), Gately
and Huntington (2002), Small and Van Dender (2007), and Hughes et al. (2008), among others.
Typically, these studies focus in estimating short-run price and income elasticities of gasoline
4The FFR is an indicator of the US's monetary policy stance and henceforth reects the monetary stance in
Qatar because of the xed peg of the Qatari riyal to the US dollar.
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demand in the US, without any explicit attention to the role of monetary policy. For work on
the supply side, see Bernanke et al. (1997, 2004), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), and Kilian and
Lewis (2011), among many others. These studies debate the rationale for monetary tightening
in response to oil price shocks.
Figure 1: Oil Prices and the Eective Federal Funds Rate
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Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of recessions (www.nber.org/cycles.html)
Source: FRED { Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 1 plots the historical relationship between the eective FFR and oil prices over the
1970{2011 period. Until 2000, one can easily notice the positive association (or comovement)
between the two variables during both recessionary and expansionary periods, consistent with
the demand/supply side perspectives mentioned above. However, since the start of 2001, the
relationship between oil price and the FFR has been weakened signicantly. Although, both
variables moved in tandem over the 2004{2006 period, overall, their paths have diverged since
the turn of this century. Several factors explain the recent decoupling of these two economic
series.
First, following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the monetary policy stance of
the Federal Reserve (hereafter `the Fed') was primarily expansionary in response to periods of
heightened volatility. In particular, the US's involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
were the main reason for heightened uncertainty in economic activity. By May 2004, the FFR
5
dropped to 1%.5 However, interest rates began increasing after the Fed started tightening their
policy in mid-2004, which resulted in a persistently gradual increase in the FFR that reached
5.25% by June 2006. Shortly after the nancial turbulence that began on August 9 and 10,
2007,6 the Fed's easing campaign began in September 2007, with a cut of 50 basis points in the
target for the FFR. By the end of 2007, the FFR dropped to 4.25%. However, as indications of
economic weakness proliferated, the Fed responded by reducing the target rate by an additional
225 points to 2% by May 2008. However, amid continuing deterioration of the global economy,
the Fed|in concert with unprecedented coordinated interest rate cuts by major central banks|
reduced the target for the FFR by an additional 100 basis points in October 2008 (see Bernanke,
2008). By December 2008, the Fed reduced its target further, setting a range of 0 to 25 basis
points for the targeted FFR. Since then, the targeted FFR has remained within that range and
is expected to remain at these exceptionally low levels at least as long as the unemployment
rate remains above 6.5% and longer-term ination expectations continue to be well anchored
(see Federal Reserve, 2013). It is worth mentioning here that besides cutting the target for
the FFR, the Fed deployed a variety of unconventional monetary policy tools including forward
guidance that changed the size and composition of its balance sheet (see Bernanke, 2012).
Meanwhile, the annual average nominal price of oil steadily increased from a low of around
$25 a barrel at the end of 2001 to above $100 a barrel in the rst half of 2008, followed by
an even more spectacular price collapse with the intensication of the global nancial crisis
triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Although oil prices had fallen
sharply in the nal quarter of 2008, but soon thereafter, oil prices have kept rising over the
2009{2011 period. In particular, as Figure 1 shows, oil prices tended to mean-revert over 1973{
2000, but since the beginning of 2001, they have exhibited a highly positive trend. Clearly,
the super-easy monetary stance of the Fed during a decade of mostly rising oil prices is more
than a mere coincidence of the decoupling of oil price and the FFR. Instead, the post-crisis
evidence suggests that the policy goal of the Fed has been primarily centered around stabilizing
a deterioration housing market and stimulating employment by maintaining a lower (nominal)
cost of investment for a protracted period. Needless to say, the Fed is tracking and monitoring
5See Neely (2004) for a description of the Fed's reaction to crisis or potential crisis in the nancial markets.
6On August 9 and 10, of 2007, the spread between the three-month London interbank oered rate (LIBOR)
and the three-month Overnight Index Swap jumped to unusually high levels and has remained high ever since.
This event was dubbed a \black swan" in the money market by Taleb (2007) and by Taylor and Williams (2009)
due to its unusual appearance. See Cecchetti (2008) for a full discussion of the events leading up to and including
the crisis. An event timelines of the US and international policy responses to the global nancial crisis is available
online at: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global economy/policyresponses.html
6
ination development, such that \it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run
goals of maximum employment and ination of 2 percent" (Federal Reserve 2014, p. 10).
Second, even after controlling for the various supply disruptions and oil inventories that
constantly aect uctuations in international oil prices,7 the evidence suggests that a large
fraction of the oil price increase since 2000 has been due to higher global demand for oil|oil
consumption in China is particularly noteworthy. Since China's accession to the World Trade
Organization in 2001, the Chinese economy (in real terms) has grown at an annual rate of
nearly 10%, versus a less than average annual growth rate of 1.5% in the US. Alongside China's
astonishing output growth has come a voracious appetite for oil. Over the 2001{2009 period, the
compound annual growth rate for petroleum consumption in China was 6.7%, compared with
a falling demand growth (-0.50%) in the US.8 Together with China, much of the world demand
for oil has originated from emerging economies in Asia (including the Middle East economies).9
Interestingly, over the past few decades, the price elasticity of petroleum demand in the
US has reported a sharp decline. Estimates by Hughes et al. (2008) show that the short-run
price elasticity of gasoline demand was, in absolute values, in the range of 0.21 to 0.34 over
1975{1980, but only 0.03 to 0.07 for the 2001{2006 period. Of course, the lower price elasticies
observed in the recent decade could easily be reversed in the form of a high energy expenditure
share, should energy prices take a dramatic upturn. Therefore, it is more instructive to look at
the income elasticity of demand, which varies with the stage of economic development within a
country. Estimates by Hamilton (2009) show that income elasticity plummeted from 1.04 during
1961{1973 to 0.47 over the 1985{1997 period. The combination of an income and price elasticity
below unity pushed down the dollar value of oil expenditure as a share of total GDP at 1.1% in
1998 (compared with the large 8.3% share observed in 1980), before it went up to 5.6% for the
rst half of 2008 (Hamilton, 2009). However, the impression that the income elasticity of oil has
declined in the US becomes easier to notice when comparing results across countries. Gately
and Huntington (2002) reported an average income elasticity of 0.55 for 25 OECD countries
over the period 1971{1997, compared with 1.17 for 11 other countries characterized by rapid
7For the historical journey of the oil industry with a particular focus on the events associated with signicant
changes in the price of oil, see Hamilton (2013).
8Authors' calculations using data from EIA (2012).
9Kilian and Hicks (p. 385, 2013) pointed out that \the unexpected increase in the demand for oil after 2002
was not driven primarily by unexpectedly high growth in the OECD, but to a large extent by unexpected growth
from countries outside of the OECD." Furthermore, Smith (2009, p. 155) concluded that \some combination of
unexpectedly energy-hungry growth from China and elsewhere in the world together with a negative shift in oil
supply caused by higher production costs can explain a substantial rise in oil prices after about 2004." See also
Hamilton (2009).
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income growth and 1.11 for 11 oil-exporting countries.10
The evidence portrayed above suggests a weakening of the relationship between oil prices
and the US economy in very recent years. It also provides an indication that much of the
current, as well as future, petroleum growth will originate from emerging economies. To put
this shifting of the global oil demand in perspective, during 2006, China used about two barrels
of oil per person, against 6.6 in Mexico and 25 in the US (see Hamilton, 2009). Certainly, for
China and other emerging economies, there remains a long road ahead before we might expect
the income elasticity of the oil demand to fall to the levels of developed economies.
Figure 2: Nominal GDP{Oil Price Nexus in Qatar and the US
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Source: Oil price, FRED { Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. Nominal GDP, World Economic Outlook (IMF).
We conclude this section by making some causal remarks on the nexus between the Qatari
economy and the US economy (in particular, the US dollar); a formal statistical analysis is
presented below. Although, the US, as a net oil-importing country, has never been a main buyer
of Qatari oil, oil has been the inexorable link between the two economies. The most obvious
example of this is the international price of oil, which is traded in US dollars. Perhaps this is why
Qatar, like its neighboring Gulf countries, found it optimal to peg its national currency to the US
dollar back in June 1980, a system still exists today. Intuitively, for an oil-exporting developing
country whose currency is pegged to the US dollar, eliminating the US dollar exchange rate
risk through pegging appeared an attractive way to accumulate dollar-denominated oil exports.
Further, indexing to the US dollar served as a stimulus due to a high concentration of foreign
assets (arising from surplus oil revenues) in dollar-denominated securities (Amuzegar, 1983).
10Dahl and Sterner (1991) and Espey (1998) provide thorough reviews based on hundreds of gasoline demand
studies.
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A further justication for the exchange rate peg came from the point of view that it would
deliver price stability through a credible currency peg. Most importantly, back in the 1980s,
the US economy drove global demand and commodity markets, and hence, ceteris paribus, drove
commodity prices, including the crude oil price. Hence, from a macroeconomic management
perspective, it made good sense for the Qatari authorities to x the Qatari riyal to the US
dollar.11 The Fed's policy stance that was suitable for the US economy was also deemed to be
good for the economy of Qatar.
Figure 2 depicts the historical association between international oil prices and nominal
GDP in Qatar and the US. The US's nominal GDP shows a clear upward trend, irrespective of
uctuations in the oil price. By comparison, the (positive and strong) association between oil
price and Qatar's GDP is clearly discernable from Figure 2, highlighting the dominant role of
oil in the Qatari economy.
3 Methodology
3.1 Measures of Synchronization
This section outlines the statistical measures employed in this paper to analyze the degree of
business cycle synchronization among the variables of interest. In particular, we have employed
four synchronization measures recently proposed in the literature on (international) business
cycle synchronization. Our rst three measures of business cycle synchronization follow the
setup in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013), who employed these measures to examine the dynamics
of nancial integration and business cycle synchronization for a set of industrialized countries.
Our rst measure uses the statistic of Giannone et al. (2008), which computes business cycle
synchronization with negative divergence, dened as the absolute value of real GDP growth
dierences between country i and j in year t:
SY NCH1i;j;t =  j(lnYi;t   lnYi;t 1)  (lnYj;t   lnYj;t 1)j: (1)
Our second measure follows Morgan et al. (2004), involving two steps. First, we regress real
output growth on a country-specic intercept and a time trend:
lnYt   lnYt 1 = + t + t 8i; j;
11The process worked almost identically in other GCC countries.
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where the residuals (i;t and j;t) reect how much GDP growth diers in each country and
each year compared to average growth in this year and the average growth of this country over
the estimation period. The business cycle synchronization measure is then calculated as the
negative of the absolute dierence of residual GDP growth:
SY NCH2i;j;t   ji;t   j;tj: (2)
Intuitively, this index measures how similar GDP growth rates are between two countries in any
given year, accounting for the average growth in each country and the average growth in each
year.
Our next two measures of synchronicity are based on an output gap approach. Our third
measure (SY NCH3i;j;t) is based on computing the 5-year correlation of the cyclical component
of output (logarithm) as measured with the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter. Imbs (2006)
and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) both consider this measure in their studies.
Our fourth and nal measure of business cycle interdependence is based on the Euclidean
space proposed by Walti (2010). As the Euclidean distance between two standardized random
variables provides the same information as a correlation coecient, Walti's (2010) measure of
business cycle interdependence between the business cycle of country i, denoted as gi, and any
reference economy, denoted as gj , in year t is given by:
SY NCH4i;j;t = jgi;t   gj;tj; (3)
when SY NCH4i;j;t = 0, the business cycles of country i and the reference economy are perfectly
in tune. Any positive value means less than perfect synchronization: the larger the distance
between business cycles, the less interdependent they are.
All four synchronicity measures are applied to nominal GDP, real GDP and ination rates
between Qatar and the US over the 1980{2011 period. Nominal GDP, real GDP and the
consumer price index (CPI) for Qatar and the US have been obtained from the IMF's World
Economic Outlook database. The GDP gures are expressed in billion of US dollars, while the
CPI series are average gures for the period. A summary of data sources and lengths of the
variables is provided in Appendix C.
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3.2 Structural VAR
Following Mundell's (1961) seminal work on optimal currency area, it has been emphasized
in the literature that if the nature of disturbances in two countries are similar, the cost of
abandoning policy autonomy for monetary unication will be relatively lower. Thus if Qatar
exhibits (large) disturbances that are asymmetric to those of the US, it constitutes a poor
candidate for forming a monetary union with the US, because of the substantial loss in utility
from forsaking policy autonomy. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) proposed a structural vector
autoregression (VAR) approach to identify aggregate supply and demand disturbances so that
these estimated disturbances can be used to identify whether groups of countries are suitable
for a monetary union. We follow their method to estimate the following VAR model:
264 yt
pt
375 = 1X
i=0
Li
264 a11i a12i
a21i a22i
375
264 "dt
"st
375 ; (4)
where yt and pt represent the logarithm of real GDP and prices, respectively; L denotes the lag
operator; a11i represents elements a11 in matrix Ai; and "dt and "st are independent demand and
supply shocks, respectively. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) assume that while both demand
and supply shocks have permanent eects on the price level, only the supply (demand) shocks
have permanent (temporary) eects on the output level. This implies the following restriction:P1
i=0 a11i = 0. Model (4) is estimated using a VAR where the residuals from the VAR, et, are
transformed into structural demand and supply shocks using et = C"t, where C represents the
2  2 parameter coecient matrix. See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) for further details
relating to the identication of the C matrix.
4 Results
This section is divided into three parts. The rst part presents some preliminary data analysis
based on basic descriptive statistics and graphical analysis of the model's variables. The sec-
ond part discusses the ndings of the synchronization of the (nominal and real) output cycles
and ination rates between Qatar and the US based on the four measures described in the
previous section. Finally, part 4.3 presents the results of the nature of the supply and demand
disturbances in the two countries based on the structural VAR model outlined above.
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Evidence
Our empirical analysis begins by conducting the unit root test for all series. Results indicate
that for all series, the null hypothesis of a unit root is strongly rejected. In the interests of
brevity, unit root test results are not reported but are available on request. Table 2 presents
some basic descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the empirical analysis. Several
remarks are in order. First, both GDP and ination in Qatar have been more volatile than
those of the US over the past three decades. This higher volatility is clearly a reection of the
higher oil price volatility observed over the same period (see the second-last row in Table 2).
Second, the remarkable reduction in macroeconomic volatility observed in the US during 1990s,
the decade coinciding with the so-called \Great Moderation" era,12 has not spilled over into
Qatar, who instead experienced an elevation in macroeconomic volatility during 1991{2000.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (percent)
1981{1990 1991{2000 2001{2010
     
A. Qatar
Nominal GDP growth -0.68 12.61 8.81 14.45 19.70 17.23
Real GDP growth 1.47 4.30 6.46 8.22 12.20 6.61
Ination rate 3.66 2.27 2.75 2.11 5.29 6.97
B. United States
Nominal GDP growth 7.33 2.31 5.40 0.93 3.78 2.61
Real GDP growth 3.19 2.26 3.35 1.44 1.54 2.10
Ination rate 4.74 2.31 2.80 0.72 2.40 1.19
C. Oil price & federal funds rate
Oil price 25.22 7.53 20.28 4.18 56.02 24.67
Federal funds rate 9.44 2.96 4.96 1.05 2.35 1.82
Note:  (mean) and  (standard deviation).
Third, it is easy to see the divergence in macroeconomic variables between the two countries
in the most recent decade (2001{2010), when the level of GDP and ination in Qatar were higher
and they were very volatile, compared with the 1980s and the 1990s. These ndings provide
preliminary support for the conjecture that since the start of the new millennium, the structure
of the Qatari economy has been signicantly dierent from that of the US. The double-digit
nominal and real GDP growth rates (along with a high ination rate) observed during 2000s in
Qatar does not seem to be feasible with an exceptionally low interest rate imported from the US.
Moreover, these gures defy the very lessons of the standard textbook economic models that
12See, among others, Bernanke (2004).
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advise scal and/or monetary authorities to pursue contractionary economic policies at times
when the economy is overheating. Fourth, as already seen in Figure 1, over the past decade,
both oil prices and the FFR have shown a striking disconnection where despite the historically
high global crude oil price, the benchmark interest rate in the US kept at a low level.
Figure 3: GDP Growth Rates and Ination in Qatar and the US (percent)
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Source: Authors' calculations based on the IMF's World Economic Outlook and Qatar Statistical Au-
thority.
Figure 3 presents graphical evidence of the degree of interdependence among the three
macroeconomic variables (nominal and real GDP growth rates, and ination rates) compared
between Qatar and the US over the entire sample (1980{2011). The periods of decoupling are
highlighted by the shaded area. Consistent with the statistics reported in Table 2, Qatar's nom-
inal GDP growth rate exhibited more volatility than the real GDP growth rate. In comparison
to the US, both output growth rates appear extremely volatile and subject to frequent spikes.
Crucially, since the start of 2001, the growth in Qatar's real GDP has clearly diverged from
that of the US both qualitatively (i.e., growing in opposite direction) and quantitatively (i.e.,
widening growth gaps).13 However, it is also evident from Figure 3 that economic conditions in
Qatar and the US respond to similar shocks. This is highlighted by the direction (but not size)
of their real growth rates in response to the recent global economic crisis, which originated in
the US's housing market in 2007. Finally, following two decades of a generally steady relation-
ship, the ination rate in Qatar was higher and more volatile for most part of the past decade
compared to that of the US (see Figure 3c). However, despite the substantial dierences in
magnitude, the direction of the Qatari ination rate appears to be consistent with that of the
13To nd out whether this result was driven by increasing hydrocarbon (i.e., oil and gas) export revenues, we
have also examined the extent of interdependence between Qatar's non-hydrocarbon real GDP growth and the
US's real GDP growth over the entire sample period. The results are very similar to those shown in Figure 3,
supporting the growing growth divergence between the two economies.
13
US.
4.2 The Decoupling
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the four synchronization measures employed in the
analysis to explore the pattern of business cycle synchronization between Qatar and the US
over the past three decades. The basis of using a 10-year interval to analyze the business cycles
is made purely for convenience. The yearly variation of these measures are depicted in Figures
4{6, which provide a more explicit assessment of the decoupling hypothesis. Let us begin by
interpreting the results for nominal GDP growth, which is reported in Panel A in Table 3. As
the estimates show, the average divergence in nominal GDP growth, measured by SYNCH1, has
increased remarkably in the most recent decade (nearly 20% during 2001{2010, compared with a
level of 10{11% during 1980s and 1990s). Once we control for country-specic eects (SYNCH2),
the levels of average divergence tend to be somewhat smaller (a mean of 10.48% during 2001{
2010). Both synchronization indicators exhibit signicant variations over time (the standard
deviations are 9.54% and 10.2%, respectively, during 2001{2010 compared with the previous
10-year episodes). Interestingly, over the entire sample, although the average correlations of
the cyclical component of nominal GDP growth (SYNCH3) between the two economies remained
fairly stable (around 0.70, with the exception of the 1991{2000 period), their volatility has
increased tremendously. The standard deviation of SYNCH3 has quadrupled between the 1980s
and the 1990s, and then doubled during the 2001{2010 decade. Finally, the SYNCH4 statistics
show that the average (Euclidean) distance between the business cycles of Qatar and the US
not only increased during the last decade but was also highly volatile. In fact, the extent of the
business cycle interdependence between the two economies during the past decade, as measured
by SYNCH4, has not been very dierent from that in the 1980s, when Qatar suered acute
economic hardship in terms of lower growth and a higher ination rate (see Table 2). Overall,
the synchronization statistics for nominal GDP clearly point to a divergence in the economic
cycles between Qatar and the US over the past decade starting in 2001.
Panel B in Table 3 reports the results for real GDP growth, which is the main indicator used
in the literature when describing the characteristics of business cycles and their evolution among
countries of interest. The numbers echo the ndings of nominal GDP growth divergence, albeit
with a dierent magnitude. First and foremost, the average divergence in real GDP growth as
reported by SYNCH1 and SYNCH2 more than doubled between the 1980s and 2000s. However,
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Synchronization Measures
1981{1990 1991{2000 2001{2010
     
A. Nominal GDP growth
SYNCH1 -10.27 9.87 -11.35 7.92 -19.62 9.54
SYNCH2 -9.20 4.06 -9.01 7.28 -10.48 10.20
SYNCH3 0.70 0.07 0.52 0.28 0.69 0.57
SYNCH4 1.26 1.41 0.24 0.18 0.98 1.23
B. Real GDP growth
SYNCH1 -3.22 1.91 -4.87 6.47 -10.66 6.74
SYNCH2 -2.28 1.23 -5.53 4.44 -4.68 2.65
SYNCH3 0.61 0.16 0.50 0.31 0.34 0.22
SYNCH4 0.98 1.36 0.42 0.17 0.94 1.41
C. Ination rate
SYNCH1 -1.35 1.02 -1.28 1.54 -4.89 3.59
SYNCH2 -1.21 0.55 -1.43 1.43 -4.82 2.56
SYNCH3 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.55 0.62 0.47
SYNCH4 0.62 0.36 0.66 0.43 0.67 0.66
Note:  (mean) and  (standard deviation). SYNCH1 is the nega-
tive value of the absolute dierence in nominal GDP growth between
Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH2 is the negative of the absolute
dierence between the residual nominal GDP growth between Qatar
and the US in year t. Both SYNCH1 and SYNCH2 are expressed as
percentage. SYNCH3 is the correlation of the cyclical component of
nominal GDP (logarithm) between Qatar and the US in each ve-
year rolling period. SYNCH4 is dened as the absolute value of the
numerical dierence between two business cycles in a given year.
according to SYNCH2, both the level and volatility of the divergence in real GDP growth have
slightly declined during 2000s compared to 1990s. This is contrary to the actual real GDP
growth rates observed in the two countries in the past two decades (see Table 2). Importantly,
we nd that the average correlation of the cyclical component of real GDP growth (SYNCH3)
has declined from 0.61 in the 1980s to 0.50 during 1990s before falling further to 0.34 in the
2000s. This clearly points to the decoupling of the business cycle between Qatar and the US in
the past decade. Further complementary evidence is provided by SYNCH4, which shows that the
average (Euclidean) distance between the business cycles of the two economies has more than
doubled and exhibited more volatility during the past decade (2001{2010), compared to during
the 1990s.
Panel C in Table 3 shows mixed evidence with regard to the ination rate synchronization
between Qatar and the US. The rst two non-output gap-based measures (SYNCH1 and SYNCH2)
clearly indicate evidence of ination rate divergence in the most recent decade (2001{2010),
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while the bottom two output gap-based measures (SYNCH3 and SYNCH4) show that the ination
cycle between Qatar and the US has either become more synchronized or has remained stable
over the past three decades. A likely reason for the low divergence in ination rates, even
though variations in economic growth have remained high, is globalization which has quickened
the propagation of price pressures around the world, preventing large and sustained divergences
in ination between countries. Thus, ination has become more `globalized,' while real demand
shocks have remained `local.'14;15
4.3 The Nature of Economic Shocks
As mentioned above, one way to gauge the feasibility of a monetary union is by determining
whether the countries in question face similar aggregate disturbances. If countries face small,
symmetric disturbances, they are good candidates for forming a monetary union. To this
end, we estimated the supply and demand shocks for Qatar and the US using the structural
VAR method outlined in Section 3. The supply shocks are captured by ination rates in
the respective countries, while the demand shocks are measured by a country's real GDP.
For Qatar, two separate output measures are used. Model 1 uses the total real GDP as an
indicator of demand shocks for Qatar. However, as the Qatari economy is heavily dominated
by hydrocarbon resources, it may be dicult to distinguish between the aggregate supply and
demand disturbances in situations when the underlying output is hit by, say, a rise in oil prices.
To deal with this confusion, in Model 2, we have employed the non-oil real GDP as an alternative
measure of the demand disturbances for Qatar. The non-oil real GDP reects the demand side of
the Qatari economy more appropriately than the aggregate GDP. Table 4 shows the correlations
of the supply and demand disturbances between Qatar and the US over the past three decades.
As Table 4 shows, in general, the supply disturbances exhibit a positive correlation while
the demand disturbances are negatively correlated. According to Model 1, the correlations of
the supply and demand disturbances have systematically increased in the past three decades.
14See Borio and Filardo (2007) for cross-country evidence on this issue.
15An anonymous reviewer suggested to test the long-run relationship between federal funds rate and oil prices
as an alternative to analyze the decoupling hypothesis. Following this suggestion, we performed cointegration
analysis between federal funds rate and real price of oil using monthly data for two samples: full sample (1970{
2011) and the pre-decoupling sample (1970{2000). For the pre-decoupling sample, both trace and maximum-
eigenvalue statistics suggest a unique cointegrating vector with test statistics 18.24 (p-value: 0.01) and 15.36
(p-value: 0.03), respectively. Interestingly, for the full sample, the cointegration relationship does not hold.
In this case, the trace and maximum-eigenvalue statistics are 8.15 (p-value: 0.44) and 6.15 (p-value: 0.59),
respectively. These results suggest that the inclusion of the 2001{2010 data, which coincides with the decoupling
episode hypothesized in the paper, leads to a breakdown of the long-run equilibrium relationship between federal
funds rate and real oil price. We thank the anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion.
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Table 4: Correlations of the Supply and Demand Disturbances between Qatar and
the US
Model 1 Model 2
1981{ 1991{ 2001{ 1981{ 1991{ 2001{
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
Supply shocks 0.05 0.54 0.72 -0.81 0.69 0.62
Demand shocks -0.25 -0.53 -0.89 -0.80 -0.47 -0.90
Note: In Model 1 (Model 2), the demand shock in Qatar is represented by real
GDP (real non-oil GDP). The demand shock for the US is measured by its real
GDP. The supply shock is represented by ination rates in each country for
both models. ** indicates statistical signicance at the 5% level.
Particularly in the 2001{2010 period, which is the time period of interest in this analysis, the
results reveal that the correlations of demand disturbances between Qatar and the US are highly
negative and statistically signicant. Moreover, results are almost identical regardless of the
output measures used (Model 1 versus Model 2). As the management of demand shocks (instead
of supply shocks) is more pertinent for a country's monetary policy, the near-perfect negative
correlation of demand disturbances casts doubt on the validity of the monetary union between
Qatar and the US. It also supports the notion that Qatar should strive for an independent
monetary policy to deal with its unique demand disturbances. On the other hand, the positive
correlation of supply disturbances implies that both Qatar and the US are likely to be impacted
by similar global factors (albeit of dierent magnitude) such as changes in global commodity
prices (oil, food) and other structural factors (e.g., global supply chain disruptions). This nding
is consistent with the path of their ination rates depicted in Figure 3c.
Table 5: Disturbances and Adjustments in Qatar and the US
Supply disturbances Demand disturbances
Size Adjustment speed Size Adjustment speed
Qatar (Model 1) 0.146 0.523 0.016 n.a.
Qatar (Model 2) 0.199 0.445 0.019 n.a.
United States 0.033 0.604 0.009 n.a.
Note: In Model 1 (Model 2), the demand shock in Qatar is represented by real GDP
(real non-oil GDP). The demand shock for the US is measured by its real GDP. The
supply shock is represented by ination rates in each country for both models. n.a.,
not applicable.
While the correlation of disturbances conveys important information about the (a)symmetric
nature of economic shocks, the structural VAR dened in (4) allows us to obtain the size and the
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speed at which the respective economies adjust. As the variance of the estimated disturbances
is restricted to unity, their magnitude is inferred by using the associated impulse response
functions, which trace out the eect of a unit shock on prices and output. Following Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1994), the magnitude of the supply disturbances is measured by the long-run
output eect. Whereas the size of the demand disturbances is calculated as the sum of the
rst-year impact on output and prices.16 The supply speed of adjustment is computed by the
response after two17 years as a share of the long-run eect, while the long-run response of real
GDP to a demand shock is zero by construction.
Table 5 displays the results. As the gures show, Qatar faces much larger supply and demand
shocks compared to the US. Further, Qatar has a relatively slower speed of adjustment, as at
most half of the shocks to prices are dissipated within two years. The adjustment speed is
even slower when its output is measured by the non-oil GDP. In contrast, over three-fths of
adjustment is completed within two years in the US. These ndings are not surprising, given
that Qatar historically experienced a pro-cyclical scal policy and a limited (or no) monetary
policy exibility for dealing with idiosyncratic shocks facing the economy. The asymmetry of
shocks as well as their larger size (relative to those of the US) undermine economic viability of
the monetary union between Qatar and the US. Recent ndings by Koren and Tenreyro (2011)
complement our results. They found that GCC economies are characterized by high levels of
country-specic volatility and a high positive covariance between sectoral shocks and country-
specic shocks. Their ndings, like ours, suggest that more aggressive scal and monetary
counter-cyclical policies could be used to lower the impact of volatility on economic performance.
5 Discussion
If one considers business cycle synchronization as a major determining factor in the choice of
exchange rate regime, recent evidence of the decoupling of economic cycles between Qatar and
the US, as shown above, then raises questions on the validity of Qatar's decades-long exchange
rate peg to the US dollar. Put dierently, if the variations in Qatar's aggregate output and
price are not signicantly explained by US shocks, why should its exchange rate be determined
by movements in the US dollar alone? The US follows a counter-cyclical monetary policy in
16Unlike Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), who employed a GDP deator to measure prices, we used the CPI
as an indicator of the domestic price level. The GDP deator is not an appropriate measure of the domestic price
level in Qatar due to the high share of oil in aggregate output and the exclusion of imports in the price basket.
17Alternative choices yield the same results.
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that interest rates are raised during expansions and lowered during contractions. However, for
the Fed's counter-cyclical monetary policy to be appropriate for Qatar, the US and the Qatari
business cycles must be synchronized|a pre-condition that no longer holds for Qatar according
to our analysis.
Historically, for the oil-exporting Gulf Arab states whose national currencies are tied to the
US dollar, scal policy has been shouldered with the responsibility of achieving internal and
external stability. For example, in the run-up to the 2008{09 global nancial crisis, counter-
cyclical scal policies and nancial sector support measures helped GCC countries to cushion
the impact of the crisis. However, with the decision to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022,
Qatar has lost|to a great extent|the exibility to maneuver its scal policy for domestic
needs. This is because of the very large amount of scal spending that needs to be set aside
to nance the required infrastructure to host the World Cup. A recent estimate by Deloitte
(2013a) suggests that Qatar plans to invest over $200 billion on the 2022 World Cup-related
construction projects. To put the gures another way, this represents $100,000 per capita for
Qatar, compared to $350 per capita for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia, $73 per capita
for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and $54 per capita for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in
South Africa. Hence, Qatar will spend 1852 times more per capita to stage the same event
that South Africa did in 2010 (Gregory, 2013). Even if one assumes that Qatar is building its
infrastructure from scratch, these gures are staggering for a small country like Qatar, whose
estimated nominal non-oil GDP in 2012 stood at around $80 billion. Therefore, the non-oil
sector is at a greater risk of overheating and rising ination from spending on infrastructure for
the World Cup.
The upshot of all this is that Qatar's scal policy is now on autopilot to follow an expan-
sionary scal stance over the next decade. The Qatari government's commitment to nance
an ambitious infrastructure target and the resulting loss of discretionary power in scal pol-
icy implies that the government will not be able to use a `counter-cyclical' scal policy in the
environment of an overheated economy. This presents a unique challenge for policymakers in
Qatar. One the one hand, its monetary policy is constrained by the xed dollar peg; on the
other hand, its scal policy is now much less exible and may be unable to adjust its spending in
response to changes in the economic environment. The loss of both scal and monetary policy
tools has exposed the Qatari economy to the vagaries of internal and external shocks. It is at
this crucial moment that Qatar needs to reconsider the riyal{dollar xed peg in order to attain
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monetary policy independence that is oriented towards purely domestic goals. A pro active
monetary policy is also a necessary condition to oset any unwanted eects of an expansionary
scal policy on the economy. Moreover, nancial deepening and greater access to nancial ser-
vices have increased the relevance of monetary policy for non-oil economic activity in Qatar. A
need, therefore, has arisen for credible monetary plans and coordination strategies to ensure an
optimal scal{monetary mix that is consistent with growth, ination and nancial stability.
As the world's largest exporter of natural gas, Qatar's economy is closely connected with
the global gas market. Energy prices are, in part, a function of global demand. As a result, the
GDP growth of energy exporters are highly pro-cyclical with the global growth rate, particularly
China's growth rate. Growing trade ows and Asia's rising inuence in the global energy
market has increased the degree of interconnectedness between Qatar and the developing Asian
markets, while simultaneously weakening the relative importance of external links with the US
(see the Table in Appendix A). More fundamentally, the US shale gas boom will work as a key
contributing factor to the divergence between these two economies. Predicted to be a big gas
importer only a few years ago, the US is now emerging to become a major exporter of liqueed
natural gas (LNG). As a result of a largely unforeseen surge in US shale gas production, LNG
generation from Qatar's mega-trains 6 & 7 at its Ras Laan complex, once earmarked for the
US, has had to be diverted to other markets. Moreover, with the big increase in global gas
supply, Qatar will be forced to accept a more competitive price for its LNG that might fall
below the current oil-indexed prices.18 The expected decline in revenues due to price erosion
and/or supply displacement will have a signicant impact on Qatar's gas industry, which has
overtaken its crude oil industry as its biggest contributor to GDP. Last but not least, the bulk
of Qatar's foreign investment is allocated to markets in Europe and the Middle East.19 Qatar
Investment Authority (QIA), the country's sovereign wealth fund, has favored the UK and
France over other destinations in snapping up landmark buildings and football clubs, global
banks and famous brands (Financial Times, 2013). As can be seen, in all aspects of the Qatari
economy, the degree of reliance on the US economy is much less than is usually considered to
be the case.
Proponents of pegged exchange rates often argue that small oil-exporting city-states in the
18See Deloitte (2013b) for the projected price impacts of US LNG exports on Qatar and other gas exporters.
19See Table 7 in EIB (2012) for a geographical breakdown of the GCC's sovereign wealth funds investments.
Over 50% of the GCC's sovereign wealth funds are allocated to equity portfolios, followed by xed income,
infrastructure and alternative investment (e.g., private equity, hedge funds, commodities).
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Arabian Gulf should peg their currencies to the US dollar for much the same reason that
Hong Kong pegs to the dollar: their small, open economies particularly need a stable anchor.20
However, in comparison to GCC states or, more specically with Qatar, Hong Kong's business
cycle is still more synchronized with the US cycle today (even stronger than with that of
Mainland China), which might justies the city-state's nearly 30-year-old peg to the US dollar
(see Genberg et al., 2008). Moreover, in Hong Kong, there are two legal tenders: the Hong
Kong dollar (HKD) and the Chinese renminbi (RMB). Residents in Hong Kong are free to pay
for their purchases in either currency and are free to hold deposits in either currency. Thus, as
the RMB gradually erodes the market share of the HKD (RMB's current market share is about
25%), the HKD may one day cease to be an important currency for Hong Kong, as it could
simply be replaced by the fully convertible RMB. Hence, Hong Kong may never be forced|in
the conventional economic sense|to de-peg from the US dollar.21 Moreover, in relation to small
open economies, we can look at the solid track record of Singapore's managed oat regime in
maintaining price stability and tying ination expectations at the right level over the past three
decades.22 The Singaporean experience tells us that even for the small open economies of the
GCC, an independent monetary regime with a exible exchange rate system is not only feasible
but also desirable in their quest for national economic transformation.
As a nal remark, the usual rhetoric states that since oil is priced in dollars, pegging the
currencies of oil-exporting countries would help reduce the volatility of oil revenues. This
logic, however, is fatally awed, since large swings in the dollar price of oil are automatically
transmitted into large swings in government's oil export revenues. As argued by Frankel (2005)
and demonstrated by Setser (2007), the right way to deal with the dollar-induced volatility
is to allow the revenue stream from oil to have risen and fallen with the price of oil so that
the revenue from oil exports in the oil-exporting economy's own currency becomes less volatile.
Concretely, by allowing the local currency to appreciate (depreciate) when oil price is high
(low), the volatility of local currency revenues from oil is minimized. Under this arrangement,
the currencies of the GCC countries would have appreciated during the oil boom of 2003{
2008, helping central banks in the GCC to partially deal with rising imported ination and to
20See Setser (2007), which oers an erudite critique of the dangers associated with a xed peg to dollar for the
GCC states.
21We thank Stephen Jen for bringing this unique case of Hong Kong to our attention.
22See Khor et al. (2007) for an assessment of Singapore's experience with the managed oating exchange
rate system. Singapore's exchange rate system is characterized by the so-called BBC (Basket, Band and Crawl)
principle popularized by Williamson (1998). For a discussion of the applicability of the BBC system to GCC
countries, see Basher (2015).
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preserve the external purchasing power of local wages. To be sure, a more exible exchange rate
regime demands the need to strengthen nancial sector reforms and decision-making processes
to operationalize a oating regime (cf. IMF 2008). Fortunately, Qatar has recently initiated a
six-pillared strategy23 of nancial sector reforms to strengthened its nancial sector.
Summing up, xed exchange rate systems are dangerous because they may deliver `micro'
gains (e.g., rms do not need to worry about exchange rate risks) at the risk of `macro' costs (e.g.,
inationary pressure). The Gulf states' decades-long peg to the dollar has created a `Gordian
Knot' in the thinking among policymakers in the Gulf Arab states, which now requires a bold
stroke and fresh thinking to untangle this knot.24 As Victor Hugo once remarked, \You can
resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose time is come." Today de-pegging is
such an idea for Qatar and her Gulf neighbors.
6 Conclusions
Qatar's|and, by extension, the GCC's|exchange rate peg to the US dollar has been a subject
of keen interest to economists, policymakers and the general public. Using the traditional OCA
framework (Mundell, 1961; Kenen, 1969), we examine to what extent the variations in Qatar's
output and price are explained by the US's demand and shocks. A generally accepted rule of
thumb is that if shocks are symmetric across countries or regions, then a common monetary
policy response is appropriate. However, if shocks are asymmetric, countries are better o with
separate currencies so that the exchange rate can be used as a tool of adjustment. Applying
various measures of business cycle synchronization, we found that the business cycles between
the two countries have experienced greater divergence or decoupling during the opening of the
21st century. Moreover, the results from a standard structural VAR model shows that the
correlations among demand shocks between the two countries are dissimilar, suggesting that
the imported monetary policy stance of the Fed has not been viable for Qatar in recent years.
As a policy implication of our ndings, a more independent monetary policy oriented towards
23This entails enhancing regulation by developing a consistent risk-based micro-prudential framework, expand-
ing macro-prudential oversight, strengthening nancial market infrastructure, enhancing consumer and investor
protection, promoting regulatory co-operation and building human capital. See QCB (2013) for further discus-
sion.
24The legend of the Gordian Knot is associated with Alexander the Great. In 333 BC, when Alexander arrived
at the town of Gordium in Asia Minor, he attempted to untie an intricate knot tied to an ox cart. In front of a
crowd, Alexander struggled to undo the knot and became frustrated. He drew his sword and severed the knot in
one stroke. This famous incident is commonly called the \Alexandrian Solution." Recently, the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, described the recent post-crisis evolution of the Fed's ballooning balance sheet
as a `monetary Gordian Knot,' a result created from each round of quantitative easing (Fisher, 2013).
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purely domestic goals is recommended.
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Appendix: Supplementary Materials
A Trade, Labor Mobility and Risk-Sharing Mechanisms be-
tween Qatar and the US
The purpose of this section is to assess the inter-relationships of trade, labor mobility and risk-
sharing between Qatar and the US over the past three decades. This is necessary to evaluate the
strength of the current monetary union in light of these additional criteria of the OCA theory,
in addition to the similarity of shocks and cycles between these two countries.
Table A: Qatar's Trade Integration with the Rest of the World (percent)
Exports to Imports from
1981{ 1991{ 2001{ 1981{ 1981{ 1991{ 2001{ 1981{
1990 2000 2010 2010 1990 2000 2010 2010
United States 0.79 2.76 1.32 1.62 8.99 11.47 11.79 10.75
European Union 25.78 1.90 4.54 10.74 41.70 37.45 35.44 38.20
Japan 42.23 53.11 40.39 45.24 18.54 12.94 9.19 13.56
EM and Developing 19.95 17.98 17.12 18.35 19.42 28.54 34.02 27.33
MENA 5.92 6.23 4.60 5.58 8.14 16.38 17.66 14.06
Note: Figures are given as a percentage of total exports or imports. The authors's calculations use
data from Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF.
As the movement of goods is a key criteria of the OCA theory, Table A looks at the extent
of trade integration between Qatar and the US, as well as other countries and regions. We
nd that, on average, less than 2% of Qatar's exports (mainly oil and natural gas) are sold
in the US, while the US's share in Qatar's aggregate imports is about 10{11%. These gures
are very low compared with Japan (in terms of exports) and the European Union (in terms of
imports), implying that the US is not a key trading partner of Qatar. Even in the oil boom
years of 2000s when Qatar's import spending grew by nearly 500% between 2001 and 2010,
the US's market share in Qatar's total imports remained stable at the level seen during 1990s.
A likely explanation for the puzzling stagnation of the US market share in Qatar's imports is
the rise of China's market share, which grew from about 1.70% in 1991{2000 to 4.85% during
2001{2010 (a 185% increase). In particular, the US, the European countries and Japan faced
strong competition from Chinese manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment.25
25See Habibi (2011) for an investigation of the market shares of advanced countries and China in the import
markets of Arab countries over the past few decades.
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Furthermore, geo-political developments such as the September 11 terrorist attack and the US's
war with Afghanistan and Iraq may have played an indirect role behind the market gains for
Asian and Middle Eastern products, compared with US and European goods (Habibi, 2011).
This evidence suggest that trade between Qatar and the US is not a strong argument to support
an OCA between the two countries.
Although non-nationals account for over 80% of the total population in Qatar, less than 2%
of Qatari citizens have sought migration outside their home country as resident.26 Hampered
by a small population size, Qatar|like her other Gulf neighbors|depends heavily on foreign
workers to support domestic economic activities. Although thousands of American employees
(civil and defense) are working in Qatar in a range of sectors; Qataris, in general, demonstrate
a marked preference for employment at home, especially in the public sector, where superior
benets, higher wages and shorter working hours are seen as more appealing (Babar, 2011).
Furthermore, unlike their American counterparts, skills and capacity levels among Qataris, up
until now, have been inadequate in terms of providing a match for the skills required by the US
employers.27 Thus a high reservation wage and a limited skill set constrain Qataris from taking
advantage of employment opportunities in the US. However, the movement of the US workers in
Qatar mainly reect the latter's demand for highly-skilled Western workers in its non-oil sector.
It is worthwhile to mention here that Qatar currently serves as host to major US military
facilities as support for its domestic security. Furthermore, Qatari law does not recognize dual
nationality and requires that Qatari citizens only hold Qatari citizenship, suggesting that the
share of people in Qatar who were born outside the country or in the US would be negligible. All
in all, the labor mobility criterion for an OCA between Qatar and the US can be characterized
by essentially one-way ows of labor. The levels of mobility and integration seen among the US
states or Eurozone countries remain a distant prospect for Qatar, given distance, mismatched
incentives, language and other barriers.
As regards to the risk-sharing criterion, cross-border automatic stabilizing mechanisms|
such as those involving national scal taxes and transfers that vary with the local business
cycle|are absent in both Qatar and the US because of the non-standard nature of the currency
union. Qatar is in a monetary union with the US in the sense that its national currency
26Authors' calculations are based on statistics from the Qatar Statistical Authority and the International
Organization for Migration.
27A 2009 Arab Knowledge Report reported that annually only a limited number of nationals graduated with
scientic or technical qualications across the GCC. See UNDP and MBRF (2009) for further details.
25
maintains a xed parity with the US dollar and therefore adopts the Fed's monetary policy as
its own. However, its scal policy is carried out independently from that of the US and they
are not in a `scal union' in the sense that one central authority is in charge of the union-wide
scal policy. Recent developments in the Eurozone underscore the signicance of a scal union
in allowing smoother and more symmetrical adjustment between its members in times of crisis.
Furthermore, although the OCA theory neglects the role of a banking union, the banking and
nancial crisis facing the Eurozone suggests that a banking union|involving common banking
supervision, common resolution procedures and common deposit insurance|is also essential for
the survival of a union.
Summing up, the discussion above makes it clear that on the OCA grounds of the integration
of trade, labor mobility and scal risk-sharing mechanisms, Qatar and the US appear poor
candidates for forming a monetary union. This is because of the non-standard nature of the
currency union between the two economies, in which Qatar only maintains a xed exchange
rate parity with the US dollar, an arrangement that does not necessarily ensure the benets of
increasing trade integration, enhancing labor mobility or making a stronger scal center.
B A Brief History of the Exchange Rate System in Qatar
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971, Qatar adopted the
monetary policy rule of targeting the exchange rate.28 The Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA)
was established in 1973 and the new issue of Qatari riyal (QR) replaced the previous notes
issued by the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board. Initially, the QR was pegged to the US dollar,
conditional on keeping its par value against pure gold (equivalent to 0.21 units of special drawing
rights or SDRs). This is was followed by pegging the QR to the SDRs at the rate of 0.21 SDRs
with a uctuation margin of 2:25%. Under this arrangement, the US dollar exchange rate
against the QR was to be determined on the basis of its exchange rate against the SDRs, as the
latter is determined by the IMF. The exchange rates of all other currencies against the QR were
to be determined on the basis of the respective currency's exchange rate against the US dollar
in the international nancial markets. Subsequently, the tolerable uctuation margin of the QR
against the SDR was increased to 7:25% in early 1976, due to the appreciation of the US dollar
against the SDRs in late 1975. The QMA adopted the US dollar as the intervention currency.
28This section draws heavily on Elsamadisy and Hamadi (2008).
26
The exchange rates of currencies other than the US dollar against the QR were determined
in line with their market values against the dollar. The QMA revalued the QR against the
US dollar during the second half of the 1970s|whenever the latter depreciated sharply|to
stabilize the QR against the currencies of Qatar's major import-trading partners other than
the US to alleviate the pressure of imported ination.29 Eventually, when the US dollar started
trending upward (in July 1980) vis-a-vis other major currencies, this led the QMA to maintain
the de facto exchange rate of QR3.64 per US$1 unaltered. The immediate impact was the
appreciation of QR with the appreciating dollar against the major currencies of Qatar trading
partners, particularly the European countries.
Table B: Chronology of Qatar's Exchange Rate System
Period Currency in Nominal National currency per
circulation anchor Pound Sterling/SDRs/USD
Prior to Indian Rupee & Sterling
June 1966 Gulf Rupee Pound
June- Saudi
Sept. 1966 Riyal
Sept. 1966{ Qatar-Dubai Sterling 13.33
Nov. 1967 Riyal Pound
Nov. 1967{ Qatar-Dubai Sterling 11.76
Aug. 1971 Riyal Pound
Aug. 1971{ Qatar-Dubai USD Par value against gold at
May 1973 Riyal 0.186621g of ne gold
May 1973{ Qatari USD "
March 1975 Riyal
March 1975{ Qatari SDRs 4.76192.25%
Jan. 1976 Riyal
Jan. 1976{ Qatari SDRs 4.76197.25%
July 1980 Riyal
July 1980{ Qatar USD 3.64
Present Riyal
Source: Department of Research and Monetary Policy, Qatar Central Bank.
SDRs: Special Drawing Rights; USD: US dollar.
The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) was established in 1993 by Decree Law No. 15/1993. Since
its inception, QCB has inherited QMA's monetary policy strategy of targeting the exchange
rate. The de facto xed parity between the US dollar and the QR (i.e., QR3.64 per dollar) is
the inherited nominal anchor for the QCB's monetary policy. The heritage has been constantly
29Over the period March 1976 until June 1980, the QR was revalued twelve times|adding up to 8.5%|against
the US dollar, compensating for the depreciation of 13.4% in the dollar's value against the SDRs.
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honored and the peg has always been highly credible. The peg target was made de jure in 2001
by Decree No. 34/2001, replacing the de jure exchange rate arrangement of the QR/SDRs peg
that had been in eect since 1975. Other currencies are traded based on the QCB-determined
QR{dollar exchange rate and the market-determined exchange rate of a given currency against
the US dollar. A timeline of Qatar's exchange rate at dierent points in time is shown in Table
B.
C Data
The following table reports data sources and lengths of the variables used in the study.
Table C: Data Sources
Variable Year Source
Oil price (WTI, US$ per barrel) 1970{2011 FRED
Federal funds rate 1970{2011 "
Nominal GDP 1980{2011 WEO
Real GDP 1980{2011 "
Ination rate 1980{2011 "
Qatar's exports to abroad 1981{2010 DOTS
Qatar's imports from abroad 1981{2010 "
Source: FRED is the electronic economic database main-
tained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2). DOTS (Direction of
Trade Statistics) and WEO (World Economic Outlook) are
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Figure 4: Nominal GDP Synchronization across Time
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Figure 4 plots the evolution of the four synchronization measures employed in the empirical analysis
across the 1980{2011 period. SYNCH1 is the negative value of the absolute dierence in nominal GDP
growth between Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH2 is the negative of the absolute dierence of the
residual nominal GDP growth between Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH3 is the correlation of the
cyclical component of nominal GDP (logarithm) between Qatar and the US in each ve-year rolling
period. SYNCH4 is dened as the absolute value of the numerical dierence between two business cycles in
a given year. Low values of SYNCH1 and SYNCH2 indicate greater divergence, while high values of SYNCH3
and SYNCH4 indicate greater divergence.
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Figure 5: Real GDP Synchronization across Time
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Figure 5 plots the evolution of the four synchronization measures employed in the empirical analysis
across the 1980{2011 period. SYNCH1 is the negative value of the absolute dierence in nominal GDP
growth between Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH2 is the negative of the absolute dierence of the
residual nominal GDP growth between Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH3 is the correlation of the
cyclical component of nominal GDP (logarithm) between Qatar and the US in each ve-year rolling
period. SYNCH4 is dened as the absolute value of the numerical dierence between two business cycles in
a given year. Low values of SYNCH1 and SYNCH2 indicate greater divergence, while high values of SYNCH3
and SYNCH4 indicate greater divergence.
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Figure 6: Ination Synchronization across Time
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Figure 6 plots the evolution of the four synchronization measures employed in the empirical analysis
across the 1980{2011 period. SYNCH1 is the negative value of the absolute dierence in nominal GDP
growth between Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH2 is the negative of the absolute dierence of the
residual nominal GDP growth between Qatar and the US in year t. SYNCH3 is the correlation of the
cyclical component of nominal GDP (logarithm) between Qatar and the US in each ve-year rolling
period. SYNCH4 is dened as the absolute value of the numerical dierence between two business cycles in
a given year. Low values of SYNCH1 and SYNCH2 indicate greater divergence, while high values of SYNCH3
and SYNCH4 indicate greater divergence.
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